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Note 
Patterson v. McLean: 
A Confirmation of the New Right at the U.S. Supreme Court 
George M. SULLIVAN * 
Vers la fin du second mandat du président Reagan, le juge en chef Lewis 
Powell fit savoir qu 'il se retirait. Il devenait dès lors évident que la dernière 
nomination qu'allait faire Monsieur Reagan risquait de changer l'idéologie 
dominante au sein de la Cour suprême en faisant pencher la balance du côté 
du conservatisme, pour la première fois depuis la présidence de Dwight 
Eisenhower. 
Les juges Sandra Day O'Connor et Antonin Scalia, nommés précédemment 
par Monsieur Reagan, formaient en effet, en compagnie de William Rehnquist 
et Bryon White, nommés respectivement par les présidents Nixon et Kennedy, 
une minorité bruyante au sein de la Cour, qui se faisait entendre particulièrement 
dans les affaires de droits de la personne. Cette occasion inattendue donnée 
au président Reagan de nommer un cinquième juge conservateur inquiéta 
grandement les médias et aussi le Sénat qui doit ratifier les nominations à la 
Cour suprême. 
L'article examine l'effet de la nomination du juge Anthony Kennedy. Cet 
effet, qui s'est manifesté de façon immédiate, indique que dans les affaires de 
droits de la personne l'idéologie conservatrice va dominer jusqu'à la fin du 
siècle. 
In two consecutive national elections a conservative, Ronald Reagan, 
was elected President of the United States. When Justice Lewis Powell 
announced his retirement during the late months of the Reagan administration, 
it was apparent that the President's last appointment could shift the ideology 
of the Court to conservatism for the first time since the presidency of Dwight 
Eisenhower. 
* J.D., LL.M., Professor, Management Department, Southern Illinois University. 
Les Cahiers de Droit, vol. 30, n° 4, décembre 1989, p. 987-1009 
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President Reagan's prior appointments, Sandra Day O'Connor and 
Antonin Scalia, had joined William Rehnquist, an appointee of President 
Nixon and Bryon White, an appointee of President Kennedy to comprise a 
vociferous minority of four in many instances, especially cases involving civil 
rights. The unexpected opportunity for the appointment of a conservative 
jurist caused great anxiety in the media and in the U.S. Senate, the later 
having confirmation power over presidential appointments to the Supreme 
Court. 
This article examines the consequences of the Senate's confirmation of 
Justice Anthony Kennedy to the Supreme Court. The impact, which was 
immediate and dramatic, indicates that conservative ideology will predominate 
on major civil rights issues for the remainder of this century. 
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On June 15, 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its 
long-awaited decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union ' which substantially 
diluted § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 18662. The case represented the 
fourth major set back for the Court's liberal justices in a racial case since 
January 23, 19893. 
Patterson v. McLean had attracted an unusual amount of pre-decision 
attention because it was viewed as the ultimate battle for ideological supremacy 
between the Court's liberals and conservatives. The case had originally been 
argued on February 29,1988 and the issue to be decided was whether a claim 
for racial harassment in employment was actionable under § 1981 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 \ 
On June 26, 1987, conservative President Ronald Reagan, who had 
already appointed Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia to the 
Court, received an opportunity for a third appointment when Justice Lewis 
Powell announced his retirement5. The President's first two nominees, 
Judges Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsberg were both unsuccessful in gaining 
the necessary confirmation from the U.S. Senate6. The President's third 
choice, Judge Anthony Kennedy of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, was 
ultimately confirmed unanimously by the Senate7, and the three Reagan 
appointees together with Justices Byron White and William Rehnquist, 
appointees of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon, respectively, 
appeared to constitute a new conservative majority on the Court. 
The worst apprehensions of the liberals materialized on April 25, 1988 
when the five conservatives elected to expand the scope of Patterson v. 
1. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, (1989), 57 U.S.L.W. 4705. 
2. 42U.S.C. §1981. 
3. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, (1989), 57 U.S.L.W. 4132; a 30% minority 
set-aside program adopted by a city council was found to be violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in a 6-3 decision ; on June 5, 1989 in Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio, 
(1989), 57 U.S.L.W. 4583, the Court altered its interpretation of the disparate impact test 
which had first been articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) in a 5-4 
decision; on June 12, 1989 in Martin v. Wilks, (1989), 57 U.S.L.W. 4616, the Court held 5-4 
that individuals were not precluded from challenging employment decisions taken pursuant 
to consent decrees, when they had not been parties to the proceedings in which the decree was 
entered. 
4. 42U.S.C. §1981 provides: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every 
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licences and exactions of every kind and to no other. 
5. New York Times, June 27, 1987, p. I. 
6. New York Times, October 24, 1987, p. 1 and November 8, 1987, p. 1. 
7. New York Times, February 4, 1988, p. A18. 
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McLean to the more fundamental issue of whether § 1981 should be available 
to minorities in any private civil rights litigation8. Immediately, the case 
represented a far more pervasive conflict than the case of racial harassment 
brought by Brenda Patterson against her employer9. 
1. Facts of Patterson 
Between May 1972 and July 1982, Brenda Patterson was employed by 
the McLean Credit Union as a teller and a file coordinator until she was laid 
off. After her termination, she commenced an action in the federal district 
court, alleging that in violation of § 1981, her employer had harassed her, 
failed to promote her, and then discharged her, all because of her race. She 
also claimed that this conduct constituted an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, actionable under North Carolina tort law. 
Originally, Robert Stevenson, the General Manager and later President 
of McLean Credit Union, interviewed Brenda Patterson for a file clerk 
position in 1972. At that time, he warned her that all those with whom she 
would be working were white women and that they probably would not like 
working with a black. He told Patterson on a number of occasions that 
"blacks are known to work slower than whites by nature" and as he put it in 
one instance, "some animals are faster than other animals"10. 
Stevenson also repeatedly suggested that a white would be able to do the 
petitioner's job better than she could. Although Patterson related her desire 
to move up and advance at McLean to an accounting or secretarial position, 
she was offered no training for a higher-level job during the entire course of 
her employment. Meanwhile, white employees were offered training, including 
a white employee at the same level as Patterson but with less seniority. The 
less senior white employee was eventually promoted to an intermediate 
accounting clerk position. Patterson claimed that during her ten years of 
employment, white persons were repeatedly hired for more senior positions, 
without any notice of these job openings being posted, and without Patterson 
ever being informed of these opportunities. 
8. 108 S.Ct. 1419(1988). 
9. See e.g., "Is the Supreme Court Rethinking or Revoting?" The National Law Journal, 
May 9, 1988 at 5, 8 ; FREIVOGEL, "Rights Lawyers Fear Reversal by High Court", St. Louis 
Post Dispatch, May 8, 1988 at BI, B7 ; KILPATRICK, "Second Guessing at the Supreme 
Court", St. Louis Post Dispatch, May 1, 1988 at B3 ; ELSASSER, "High Court Will Review 
Rights Ruling", Chicago Tribune, April 26, 1988 at 1 ; TYBOR, "Ruling Shows How Court 
Turned Right", Chicago Tribune, April 26, 1988 at 10. 
10. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4718. 
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She claimed to have received different treatment as to wage increases as 
well as promotion opportunities. She contended that she had been denied a 
promised pay raise after her first six months of employment, although white 
employees automatically received pay raises after six months. Patterson 
testified at length about allegedly unequal work assignments given by Stevenson 
and her other supervisors, and detailed the extent of her work assignments. 
When she complained about her work load, she was given no help with it. In 
fact, she was given more work, and was told she always had the option of 
quitting. 
Patterson also claimed that she was given more demeaning tasks than 
white employees, and was the only clerical worker who was required to dust 
and to sweep. She was also the only clerical worker whose tasks were not 
reassigned during a vacation. Whenever whites went on vacation, their work 
was reassigned ; but Patterson's work was allowed to accumulate for her 
return. She further claimed that Stevenson scrutinized her more closely and 
criticized her more severely than white employees. Stevenson, she claimed, 
would repeatedly stare at her while she was working, although he would not 
do this to white employees. He also made a point of criticizing the work of 
white employees in private or discussing their mistakes at staff meetings 
without attributing the error to a particular person. But he would chastise 
Patterson and the only other black employee publicly at staff meetings ". 
2. Procedural Background 
At trial, it was determined that a claim for racial harassment was not 
actionable under § 1981 and the court declined to submit that part of the case 
to the jury. Interestingly, of the thirty-two cases of racial harassment in 
employment to reach the circuit courts of appeals between 1971 and 1987, 
when the Supreme Court agreed to hear Patterson v. McLean, twenty-two 
cases had discussed § 1981 and only Patterson v. McLean had challenged the 
applicability of the statute12. For reasons which are unclear13, Patterson did 
not file a complaint on the basis of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196414. 
11. Id. 
12. Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184 (2n<l Cir. 1987) ; Beaufordv. Sisters of Mercy, 816 
F.2d 1104(6th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 259 (1987) ; Nazaire v. TWA, 807 F.2d 1372 
(7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 1979 (1987) ; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 
F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), cert, granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987) ; Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 
799 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1986); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7"> Cir. 
1986) ; Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439 (5 th Cir. 1986) ; Briggs v. Anderson, 796 F.2d 1009 
(8th Cir. 1986) ; Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1986) ; Snell v. Suffolk 
County, 782 F.2d 1094 (2nd Cir. 1986); Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303 
(7th Cir. 1985); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastics Products, 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. 
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Thejury did receive and deliberate upon Patterson's § 1981 claims based 
on her allegations of discrimination concerning her discharge and the failure 
to promote her. The jury found in favor of the employer in both instances. 
Concerning Patterson's state law claim, the trial judge directed a verdict for 
the employer on the ground that its conduct did not rise to the level of 
outrageousness required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress under the applicable standards of North Carolina Law. 
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appealsl5, Patterson raised 
one of the two issues which was to become crucial on appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. She challenged the district court's refusal to submit to the 
jury her § 1981 claim based on racial harassment. The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the determinations of the federal district court on the racial harassment 
issue, holding that while instances of racial harassment may implicate the 
terms and conditions of employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, and might be probative of the discriminatory intent required to be 
shown in a § 1981 action, racial harassment itself was not cognizable under 
§ 1981 because "racial harassment does not abridge the right to 'make' and 
'enforce contracts'"16. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the issue. On February 29, 
1988, the Court heard oral arguments on these matters. While employment 
law practitioners were awaiting the Court's decision, and shortly after the 
Senate confirmation of Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court, without prompting 
from the parties involved in the litigation, dramatically expanded the scope 
and importance of the controversy. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Lane v. Sotheby Parke Bernet, Inc., 758 F.2d 71 (2nd Cir. 
1985); Torresv. County ofOakland, 758 F. 2d I47(6th Cir. 1985) ; Nichelson v. Quaker Oats 
Co., 752 F.2d 1153 (6lh Cir. 1985), vacated, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985); Holsey v. Armour and 
Co., 743 F.2d 199 (4"> Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985); Carter v. Duncan-
Higgins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ; Tolliver v. Yeargan, 728 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 
1984) ; Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1983) ; Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic 
Co., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982); 
Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922 (5lh Cir. 1982) ; Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 
975(3rdCir. 1981 ) ; Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250(8thCir. 1981); DeGrace v. 
Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796 (ls l Cir. 1980) ; Bowers v. Kraft Foods Corp., 606 F.2d 816 (8lh Cir. 
1979) ; Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978) ; Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 
F.2d 281 (10lh Cir. 1978); Jenkins v. Caddo-Bossier Ass'n., 570 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Cariddi v. K.C. Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977) ; Washington v. Safeway 
Corp., 467 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1972) ; and Rogersv. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5lh Cir. 1971), cert, 
denied, 406 U.S. 957(1972). 
13. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4709. 
14. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(1964). 
15. 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), cert, granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987). 
16. Id., at 1146. 
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The additional issue to be briefed and argued was : "Whether or not the 
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by the Court in the 1976 case of 
Runyon v. McCrary n should be reconsidered"18. 
The reaction of the liberal justices, now obviously a minority on the 
Court, to the procedural tactic of the newly-empowered conservatives was 
highly critical : 
The adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the initiative 
of lawyers, rather than on the activism of judges... If the Court decides to cast 
itself adrift from the constraints of the adversary process and to fashion its own 
agenda, the consequences for the nation... will be even more serious than a 
temporary encouragement of previously rejected forms of racial discrimination. " 
3. Conservative Domination 
On June 15, 1989, the United States Supreme Court rendered its fourth 
consecutive conservative decision since January 23, 1989 in a controversy 
involving race20. The changes in Court philosophy enunciated in City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio and Martin v. 
Wilks were completed for the current Supreme Court Term with its decision 
in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 
With a 5-4 majority21, the Court stated that : 
We now decline to overrule our decision in Runyon v. McCrary [...] We hold 
further that racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment is not 
actionable under § 1981 because that provision does not apply to conduct which 
occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the 
right to enforce established contract obligations.22 
There was an immediate and hostile media reaction to the Court's 
decision and many called for the U.S. Congress to enact legislation to off-set 
the anticipated impact of Patterson23. 
17. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
18. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988). 
19. 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1423. (Opinion of Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
20. See cases cited, supra, note 3. 
21. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White, 
O'Connor and Scalia, J.J., joined. 
22. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4705. 
23. See, e.g., "NAACP Head Urges Civil Disobedience", (compiled news services), St. Louis 
Post Dispatch, July 10, 1989 at 18B; "The Court Veers Right", St. Louis Post Dispatch, 
editorial, July 6, 1989 at 2B; MCGRORY, "Supreme Court Gives All Something to Hate", 
St. Louis Post Dispatch (syndicated), July 3, 1989 at 3B; "Coming Conflict Over Civil 
Rights", editorial, Newsday, Long Island, New York, reprinted in St. Louis Post Dispatch 
June 24, 1989, at 2B; COHEN, "Second Reconstruction Ended by High Court", St. Louis 
Post Dispatch, June 24, 1989 at 3B ; GREENHOUSE, "New Limit is Placed on Scope of 1866 
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4. The Patterson-Runyon Controversy 
Although the Court severely undermined the remedial applicability of 
§1981 in the private sector, postformation contractual controversies, it did 
sustain its applicability to matters involving the formation and enforcement 
of contracts. 
In Runyon, the Court had considered whether § 1981 prohibited private 
schools from excluding children who were qualified for admission, solely on 
the basis of race. It held that § 1981 did prohibit such conduct, noting that it 
was already well-established in prior decisions that § 1981 prohibited "racial 
discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts"24. 
Even though the Court was disinclined to overrule its decision in 
Runyon, ostensibly on the basis of stare decisis, unquestionably it had firm 
grounds for doing so. The Court related that it had "said often and with great 
emphasis that 'the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to 
the rule of law'"25. It cautioned however, that although "'stare decisis is a 
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest 
decision', it is indisputable that stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle 
within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult 
task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based 
upon 'an arbitrary discretion'"26. It also related that stare decisis ensured 
Rights Law", New York Times, June 23, 1989 at A12; STRAUSS, "Civil Rights, Double 
Standards and the Top Court", Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1989 at 19; RASPBERRY, 
"Turning Civil Rights into Running Battles", St. Louis Post Dispatch (syndicated), June 19, 
1989 at 2B ; "The Court's Retreat on Civil Rights", editorial, Chicago Tribune, June 19, 
1989 at 14; LABATON, "Bias Rulings Aid Japan's U.S. Units", New York Times, June 19, 
1989 at D2 ; "High Court Rulings Spur New Civil Rights Strategy", The Washington Post, 
reprinted in St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 18, 1989 at 3A; CHAPMAN, "Colorblindness, 
Civil Rights and the High Court", Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1989 at 3, section 4; "The 
Court Retreats Again", St. Louis Post Dispatch, editorial, June 18, 1989 at 2B ; EAGLETON, 
"An Unhappy Birthday for Civil Rights Act", St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 18, 1989 at 2B ; 
RASPBERRY, "The Shame of the Supreme Court", Washington Post, June 17, 1989 at A19 ; 
"Strike Four", editorial, Washington Post, June 16, 1989, A26; KAMEN, "Court Narrows 
Scope of '76 Rights Ruling", Washington Post, June 16, 1989 at Al, A22; WERMIEL, 
"Justices Affirm Interpretation of Rights Law", Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1989 at A8 ; 
"The Court, Still Haggling Over Rights", New York Times, editorial, June 16, 1989 at 26; 
MAURO, "Civil Rights: Next Fight is in Congress", USA Today, June 16, 1989 at 1. 
24. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4706-4707, quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 
(1976); which had cited Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-460 
( 1975) and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n., Inc., 410 U.S. 431,439-440(1973). 
25. Id., p. 4707, quoting Welchv. Texas Dept. ofHighwaysand Public Transportation, 483U.S. 
468,494(1987). 
26. Id., quoting Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235,241 ( 1970) and The Federalist, 
n° 78, p. 490 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton). 
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that, "'the law will not merely change erratically' and 'permits society to 
presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the 
proclivities of individuals'"27. 
One could argue that this was a rather curious preamble from the five-
member majority which had elected to expand the relatively narrow issue of 
the case (whether § 1981 applied to cases of racial harassment) to a broad and 
controversial issue (whether § 1981 should apply to any private sector racial 
discrimination matter) on their own motion without any prompting from 
either litigant in the original Patterson case28. 
Even with respect to the original narrow issue, of the thirty-two cases of 
racial harassment in employment to reach the federal circuit courts of appeals 
between 1971 and 198729, twenty-two had discussed §1981 and only the 
Fourth Circuit had challenged the applicability of the statute. 
It is clear that Runyon v. McCrary had enjoyed an enviable record of 
stability in the lower federal courts, and it is equally apparent that if the 
newly-formed conservative majority had left well-enough alone, it would not 
have had to assume the posture of defender of stare decisis to settle that which 
had been destabilized by the conservative majority itself30. 
Justice Blackmun had alleged, that in expanding Patterson, the conservative 
majority had "fashion[ed] its own agenda" in creating the controversy in the 
first place. Having created a crisis in statutory interpretation, the conservative 
majority abandoned its frontal assault on § 1981 itself, holding that the 
statute was efficacious, at least with respect to the formation and enforcement 
of contracts. The Court concluded that : 
upon direct consideration of the issue, that no special justification had been 
shown for overruling Runyon. In cases where statutory precedents have been 
overruled the primary reason for the Court's shift in position has been the 
intervening development of the law, through either the growth of judicial 
doctrine or further action taken by Congress.31 
27. Id., quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986). 
28. See also, "Countervailing Activism? Employment Case Evokes Supreme Court Crisis", 24 
Gonz. L. Rev., 31-44 (1988). 
29. See cases cited, supra, note 12. 
30. 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 (1988). See also dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun in Patterson, 
57U.S.L.W. at 4712. 
The Court's reaffirmation of this long and consistent line of precedents establishing that 
§ 1981 encompasses private discrimination is based upon its belated decision to adhere to 
the principle of stare decisis — a decision that could readily and would better have been 
made before the Court decided to put Runyon and its progeny into question by ordering 
reargument in this case. 
31. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4704. 
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Justice Kennedy, whose presidential appointment and senatorial confir-
mation had precipitated the Patterson-Runyon controversy, maintained that 
where such changes had "removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings 
from prior decisions [...] or where later law has rendered the decision 
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies [...] the Court has 
not hesitated to overrule an earlier decision"32. 
He concluded by saying "Our decision in Runyon has not been undermined 
by subsequent changes and development in the law"33. Perhaps not, but it is 
abundantly clear that the very presence of the Runyon case before the Court 
is the best evidence that a fundamental change had taken place among the 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court. 
5. The Substantive Issue of Runyon 
Although the Court in Patterson did not overrule Runyon, it is difficult 
to conclude that Runyon was decided on sound principles of statutory 
interpretation in the first instance. Referring to the decision in Runyon itself, 
the Patterson Court related that "arguments about whether Runyon was 
decided correctly in light of the language and history of the statute were 
examined and discussed with great care in our decision." The majority in 
Patterson asserted that "It was recognized at the time that a strong case could 
be made for the view that the statute does not reach private conduct"34. 
6. Runyon Background 
The fundamental holding of Runyon v. McCrary, i.e., that § 1981 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided citizens with a cause of action for racial 
discrimination against private individuals, evolved between June 17, 1968 
and June 25, 1976 at the Supreme Court. 
In each of five cases, the Court applied a remedial provision of either 
§ 1981 or § 1982 of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866. An analysis of the language 
of the majority and minority opinions in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.35, 
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.36, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc.37, Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc.38 and Runyon v. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
36. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
37. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
38. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n., Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973). 
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McCrary leads one to the inescapable conclusion that a Supreme Court 
motivated by a desire for accelerated remediation, breathed life into a statute 
which had remained dormant for 100 years. 
Although the Court in the Patterson decision did not impact the 
availability of Title VII as a remedy for discrimination after a contract has 
been formed, a comparison of the remedial provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reveals the 
desirability of the latter statute : 
§ 1981 provides for trial by jury, while Title VII does not. 
§ 1981 provides for a statute of limitations which replicates most closely the 
relevant state statute, while Title VII has a six-month statute of limitations. 
§ 1981 provides for full common law damages, while Title VII does not. 
§ 1981 provides for back pay awards without limit of time, compared with the 
two-year limitation on back pay under Title VII. 
§ 1981 provides for the possibility of punitive damages, while Title VII does not. 
§ 1981 is not limited to employment discrimination, whereas Title VII is so 
limited. 
§ 1981 does not exempt employers of fewer than fifteen employees, bona fide 
private membership clubs with less than twenty-five members, or religious 
groups employing workers in religious-oriented positions, whereas Title VII 
does so exempt.39 
§ 1981 does not require the use of an elaborate administrative procedure prior to 
instituting litigation, whereas Title VII does so require.40 
However, 
§ 1981 only prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, ancestry or 
ethnic characteristics, while Title VII also covers sex and religion. 
§ 1981 requires a showing of an intent to discriminate, whereas Title VII does 
not.41 
7. Evolution of Runyon 
In Jones v. Mayer, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated § 1982 
(the companion section of § 1981) of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by refusing 
to sell him a home because he was black. After the two lower federal courts 
had held that § 1982 applied only to state action and did not reach private 
39. See generally St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987), for a discussion of a 
cause of action under Section 1981 ; General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n., Inc. v. P.A., 458 U.S. 
375, 391 (1982) ; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975). 
40. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4709. 
41. Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3rd Cir. 1981) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976)). 
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refusals to sell, the Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision held that § 1982 was 
intended to bar all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale 
or rental of real estate. The Court stated that the statute, as construed, was a 
valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution. However, in making this determination, the Court 
admitted that it was facing the "issue for the first time"42. 
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Jones undermined the rationale 
when he stated the "decision [...] appears [...] to be most ill-considered and ill-
advised". He believed that "the Court's construction of § 1982 as applying to 
purely private action is almost surely wrong, and at the least is open to serious 
doubt"43. 
Harlan also asserted "that the issues of the constitutionality of § 1982, as 
construed by the majority, and of liability under the Fourteenth Amendment 
alone, also present formidable difficulties". He also noted that although the 
majority opinion had focused upon the statute's legislative history, that the 
precedents of the Court were "distinctly opposed to the Court's view of the 
statute"44. 
He also argued that the entire controversy in Jones v. Mayer should have 
been dismissed as "improvidently granted" in 1968. He reasoned that "the 
Court, by its construction of § 1982, ha[d] extended the coverage of federal 
'fair housing' laws far beyond that which Congress in its wisdom chose to 
provide in the Civil Rights Act of 1968". He related that the "political process 
now having taken hold again in this very field, I am at a loss to understand 
why this Court should have deemed it appropriate or, in the circumstances of 
this case, necessary to proceed with such precipitate and insecure strides"45. 
8. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park 
The emerging § 1981 doctrine received its next advance when the Supreme 
Court decided Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, a case involving the bylaws of 
a corporation formed to operate a private residential community. When the 
board of directors refused the assignment of a membership from a white 
member to his black tenant, the member protested and was expelled from the 
corporation by the board. 
After unsuccessfully seeking an injunction and money damages at the 
state courts in Virginia, the member was vindicated at the Supreme Court, 
42. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. at 420. 
43. Id, at 449-50. 
44. Id., at 450-51. 
45. Id., at 462-63. 
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which held that the board's conduct was violative of § 1982 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. In the action which had been commenced under § 1981 and 
§ 1982 of the Act, the Court elected to limit its decision to the § 1982 issue. The 
Court contended that, "In Jones v. Mayer we reviewed at length, the 
legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. We concluded that it reaches beyond 
state action and operates upon the unofficial acts of private individuals and 
that it is authorized by the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth amendment"46. 
The Jones Court had also held that the portion of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982, necessarily implied that the portion of the 
Act, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 also applied to purely private acts of racial 
discrimination47. This determination in Jones was confirmed by the Court's 
decision in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association. The Court 
maintained that "the operative language of both § 1981 and § 1982 is traceable 
to the Act of April 9, 1866, C. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27"48. 
However, the dissenting justices in Sullivan contended that : 
In Jones v. Mayer the Court decided that a little-used section of a 100-year old 
statute prohibited private racial discrimination in the sale of real property. This 
construction of a very old statute, in no way required by its language, and open 
to serious question in light of the statute's legislative history, seemed to me 
unnecessary and unwise because of the recently passed, but then not yet fully 
effective, Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.49 
The dissent also maintained that the interpretation of § 1982, which 
admittedly had been novel in Jones v. Mayer was being extended in Sullivan 
v. Little Hunting Park. 
9. Johnson v. Railway Express 
While Jones v. Mayer and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park had addressed 
§ 1982, Johnson v. Railway Express essentially addressed § 1981. The case 
was primarily concerned with differences between Title VII and §1981 
concerning their respective statutes of limitations. The issue before the Court 
was whether the timely filing of a charge of employment discrimination with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, under § 706 of Title VII, 
tolled the running of the statute of limitations applicable to an action based 
on the same facts commenced under § 1981. 
46. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 235. 
47. Jones, 392 U.S. at 440, n. 78. 
48. Tillman, 410 U.S. at 439. 
49. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 241. 
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On this narrow issue, the Court ruled that a timely filing with the EEOC 
did not toll the statute of limitations in a § 1981 controversy50. However, the 
Court made a much broader pronouncement, not necessitated by the controversy 
before it : "Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well settled 
among the Federal Courts of Appeals — and we now j oin them — that § 1981 
affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the 
basis of race"51. 
10. The Runyon Decision 
The varied articulations of the Court's majority in Jones v. Mayer, 
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven and Johnson v. 
Railway Express concerning § 1981 and § 1982 were consolidated in 1976, 
when a divided Court decided Runyon v. McCrary. 
The principal issue before the Court was whether §1981 prohibited 
private schools from excluding qualified children solely because of race. The 
petitioning schools argued that § 1981 did not reach private acts of racial 
discrimination. The Court, in disapproving of this contention, said that it was 
"wholly inconsistent with Jones' interpretation of the legislative history of § 1 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, an interpretation that was reaffirmed in 
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park [...] and again in Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven"52. 
11. A Flawed Decision 
While the holding in Runyon was by a vote of 7-2, it is clear from the 
concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens that they had participated 
in a flawed decision. Justice Powell in the first paragraph of his opinion said : 
If the slate were clean, I might well be inclined to agree with Mr. Justice White 
that § 1981 was not intended to restrict private contractual choices. Much of the 
review of the history and purpose of this statute set forth in his dissenting 
opinion is quite persuasive. It seems to me, however, that it comes too late.53 
50. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 457. 
51. Id., at 459-60. 
52. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 173. 
53. Id., at 186. The majority opinion in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union expresses a similar 
sentiment concerning decisions which are arguably incorrectly decided : "Whether Runyon's 
interpretation of § 1981 as prohibiting racial discrimination in the making and enforcement 
of private contracts is right or wrong as an original matter, it is certain that it is not 
inconsistent with the prevailing sense of justice in this country". Patterson 57 U.S.L.W. at 
4707. (Opinion of Kennedy, J ) . 
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Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, did not add stability to the 
decision in Runyon when he related that : "For me, the problem in these cases 
is whether to follow a line of authority which I firmly believe to have been 
incorrectly decided"54. He also stated that although "Jones v. Mayer and its 
progeny had unequivocally held that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
prohibited] private racial discrimination" and that there was no doubt in his 
mind "that construction of the statute would have amazed the legislators who 
voted for it"55. 
It was the view of Justice Stevens that both the language and the 
historical setting in which § 1981 was enacted convinced him that Congress 
had intended only to guarantee all citizens the same legal capacity, to make 
and enforce contracts, to obtain, own and convey property, and to litigate 
and give evidence. Moreover, he believed that since the legislative history 
disclosed an intent not to outlaw segregated public schools at the time, it was 
quite unrealistic to assume that Congress had intended the broader result of 
prohibiting segregated private schools. He maintained that : "Were we writing 
on a clean slate, I would therefore vote to reverse"56. 
12. Dissent of Justice White 
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the majority, which 
included Justices Powell and Stevens, had extended the meaning and reach of 
§ 1981 in order "to establish a general prohibition against a private individual's 
or institution's refus[al] to [...] contract with another person because ofthat 
person's race"57. The dissent maintained that "§ 1981 ha[d] been on the books 
since 1870 and to so hold for the first time would be contrary to the language 
of the section, to its legislative history, and to the clear dictum of [the] Court 
in the Civil Rights Cases" of 18835*. In the final analysis, Justice White said : 
"The majority's belated discovery of a congressional purpose which escaped 
this Court only a decade after the statute was passed and which escaped all 
other federal courts for almost 100 years is singularly unpersuasive"59. The 
dissent also disagreed with the manner in which judicial precedents were 
54. Id., at 189. 
55. Id. 
56. Id., at 189, 190. In Runyon, parents of black children who were excluded from Virginia 
private schools, sued the school's proprietors for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as 
for compensatory damages under § 1981. 
57. Id., at 192. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
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applied. "What had already been said demonstrates that this Court's con-
struction of § 1982 in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer [...] does not require me to 
construe § 1981 in a similar manner"60. 
13. Application of Runyon in Patterson 
Although the Court in Patterson declined to attack Runyon or its 
questionable foundation (Jones, Sullivan, Tillman and Johnson) in a direct 
manner, it substantially deemphasized Runyon from a pragmatic perspective. 
Justice Brennan in dissent asserted : "What the Court declines to snatch away 
with one hand, it takes with the other"61. 
The majority, after declining to overrule Runyon and acknowledging 
that its holding remained the governing law, delivered a near-fatal volley to 
the heart of the Runyon doctrine : 
Our conclusion that we should adhere to our decision in Runyon that § 1981 
applies to private conduct is not enough to decide this case. We must decide also 
whether the conduct of which petitioner complains falls within one of the 
enumerated rights protected by § 1981.62 
This issue had been the principal issue in Patterson which had already 
been argued before the Supreme Court two months before it had decided (5-
4), on its own motion, to reconsider Runyon. 
After reciting the provisions of § 1981, the majority concluded that the 
"most obvious feature of the provision is the restriction of its scope to 
forbidding discrimination in 'the mak[ing] and enforce[mentj" of contracts 
alone. Where an alleged act of discrimination does not involve the impairment 
of one of these specific rights, § 1981 provides no relief'63. 
Apparently overlooking the principles of interpretation it had articulated 
in its opinion concerning the efficacy of the Runyon doctrine itself, the 
majority's judicial temperament shifted from permissive to restrictive. Whereas 
the majority had preserved the Runyon doctrine where admittedly "[it] was 
recognized [...] that a strong case could be made for the view that the statute 
does not reach private conduct", it failed to venerate the almost universal 
remedial interpretation of § 1981 in the federal circuit courts of appeals64. 
On the first major issue in Patterson, i.e., whether Runyon should be 
overruled, the majority predicated its holding upon stare decisis, however, 
60. /rf.,at2l3. 
61. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4711. 
62. Id., at 4708. 
63. Id. 
64. See cases cited, supra, note 12. 
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when deciding the second principal issue, i.e., whether § 1981 applied to acts 
of racial harassment, the majority resorted to legislative analysis, completely 
ignoring the history of § 1981 in the federal courts. 
The Court held that "By its plain terms, the relevant provision of § 1981 
protects two rights : 'the same right [...] to make contracts' and 'the same right 
[...] to [...] enforce contracts. ' The first of these protections extends only to the 
formation of a contract, but not to problems that may arise later from the 
conditions of continuing employment"65. 
14. Making of Contracts 
Continuing with its restrictive interpretation, the majority held that : 
The statute prohibits, when based on race, the refusal to enter a contract with 
someone, as well as the offer to make a contract only on discriminatory terms. 
But the right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or 
semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been 
established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of 
discriminatory working conditions.66 
The Court maintained that postformation conduct did not involve the 
right to make a contract, but implicated the performance of established 
contract obligations and the conditions of continuing employment. The 
Court reasoned that these matters were "more naturally governed by state 
contract law and Title VII"67. 
15. Performance of Contracts 
The majority interpreted the phraseology, "the same right [...] to [...] 
enforce contracts [...] as is enjoyed by white citizens" as embracing the 
protection of a legal process, and of a right of access to the legal process, in 
order to "address and resolve contract-law claims without regard to race"68. 
In the Court's view, this language prohibited discrimination that infected the 
legal process in ways that prevented a discriminatee from enforcing contract 
rights, by reason of race, where the discrimination is attributable to a statute 
or to existing practices. This language also covers wholly private efforts to 
impede access to the courts or the obstruction of nonjudicial methods of 
adjudicating disputes about the efficacy of binding obligations, as well as 
discrimination by private entities in enforcing the terms of a contract. 
65. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4708. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
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The Court cautioned, however, that the "right to enforce contracts does 
not [...] extend beyond conduct by an employer which impairs an employee's 
ability to enforce through legal process his or her established contract 
rights"69. 
16. The Dissent in Patterson 
Justice Brennan authored the opinion which concurred with the result 
reached by the majority in continuing the viability of Runyon, and dissented 
with respect to the Court's holding that § 1981 did not cover cases of racial 
harassment. 
Writing for a four-member minority, he said: "Having decided [...] to 
reconsider Runyon, and now to reaffirm it by appeal to stare decisis, the 
Court glosses over what are in my view two very obvious reasons for refusing 
to overrule this interpretation of § 1981 : that Runyon was correctly decided, 
and that in any event Congress has ratified our construction of the statute"70. 
Brennan, in an attempt to compensate for the majorities failure to find 
merit in the argument that Runyon was rightly decided, conducted his own 
analysis for posterity, although the doctrine of Runyon was not actually 
attacked frontly by the majority. He maintained that : "A survey of our cases 
demonstrates that the Court's interpretation of § 1981 has been based upon a 
full and considered review of the statute's language and legislative history, 
assisted by a careful briefing, upon which no doubt has been cast by any new 
information or arguments advanced in the briefs filed in this case"71. 
In the alternative, he argued that : "Even were there doubts as to the 
correctness of Runyon, Congress has in effect ratified our interpretation of 
§ 1981, a fact to which the Court pays no attention". However, he admitted 
that the absence of legislative correction was by no means in all cases 
determinative. He said that "where our prior interpretation of a statute was 
plainly a mistake, we are reluctant to 'place on the shoulders of Congress the 
burden of the Court's own error'"72. 
69. Id., quoting dissenting opinion of Justice White in Runyon, 427 U.S. at 195, n. 5. "... one 
cannot seriously contend that the grant of other rights enumerated in § 1981 [that is, other 
than the right to make contract], i.e., the rights to sue, be parties, give evidence and enforce 
contracts accomplishes anything other than the removal of legal disabilities to sue, be a 
party, testify or enforce a contract. Indeed, it is impossible to give such language any other 
meaning." 
70. Id., at 4712. 
71. Id., at 4714. 
72. Id., quoting Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978) and 
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946). 
G.M. SULLIVAN Patterson v. McLean 1005 
Justice Brennan drew a distinction, however, in cases where the Court's 
interpretation of congressional intent was plausible. In such instances, arguably 
Runyon, the Court had "often taken Congress' subsequent inaction as 
probative to varying degrees, depending upon the circumstances, of its 
acquiescence"73. He claimed that "[g]iven the frequency with which Congress 
has in recent years acted to overturn this Court's mistaken interpretations of 
civil rights statutes74, its failure to enact legislation to overturn Runyon 
appears at least to some extent indicative of a congressional belief that 
Runyon was correctly decided"75. 
Justice Kennedy, in his majority opinion, found fault with this reasoning. 
He claimed that : "It is 'impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that 
congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional approval of 
the Court's statutory interpretation"76. He argued that "Congress may 
legislate [...] only through the passage of a bill which is approved by both 
Houses and signed by the President [...] Congressional inaction cannot 
amend a duly enacted statute"77. 
Conclusion 
The American system of government reflects political reality. In two 
consecutive national elections, a conservative, Ronald Reagan was elected 
73. Id., citing Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629-30, n. 7 (1987). 
74. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-559,90 Stat. 2641,42 
U.S.C.§ 1988 (overturning Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, All U.S. 240 
(1975)) ; Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076,42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) 
(overturning General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)); Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205,96 Stat. 131, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (overturning Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)) ; Handicapped Childrenï Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-372,100 Stat. 
796, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(4)(B)-(G) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (overturning Smith v. Robinson, 
468 U.S. 992 (1984) ) ; and Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 
28, note following 20 U.S.C.A. § 1687 (Supp. 1989) (overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 
465 U.S. 555(1984)). 
75. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4714. 
76. Id., at 4708, n. 1 quoting Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-672 (1987) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia had also said : 
The majority's response to this criticism of Weber [...] asserts since 'Congress has not 
amended the statute to reject our construction... we... may assume that our interpretation 
was correct.' This assumption, which frequently haunts our opinions should be put to rest. 
It is based, to begin with, on the patently false premise that the correctness of statutory 
construction is to be measured by what the current Congress desires, rather than by what 
the law as enacted meant. To make matters worse, it assays the current Congress' desires 
with respect to the particular in isolation, rather than (the way the provision was originally 
enacted) as part of a total legislative package containing many quids pro quo. Johnson, 480 
U.S. at 671. (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
77. Id., citing U.S. Const. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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President of the United States. His three appointments to the Supreme Court 
of the United States, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia and 
Anthony Kennedy, not surprisingly, reflect in varying degrees, a more 
restrictive view of the judicial role. 
When Justice Lewis Powell announced his retirement during the late 
months of the Reagan administration, it was clear that the President's last 
appointment would shift the idealogy of the Court to conservatism for the 
first time since President Dwight Eisenhower appointed Justices Earl Warren 
and William Brennan to the High Court, and inadvertently created a liberal 
majority. 
This fact was not lost upon the liberals in the United States Senate and 
the bitter conflict for ideological supremacy materialized. On October 23, 
1987, "[o]ne of the fiercest battles ever waged over a Supreme Court nominee 
ended [...] as the Senate decisively rejected the nomination of Judge Robert 
H. Bork"78. The vote had been 58 against confirmation and 42 in favor, the 
biggest margin by which the Senate had ever rejected a Supreme Court 
nomination. There had been twenty-seven prior rejections with five in this 
century. 
The President had publicly vowed, that if Judge Bork were defeated, he 
would find a nominee who would upset Judge Bork's opponents "just as 
much" as Judge Bork himself79. The President's reaction was that "... the 
confirmation of a judicial nominee has become a spectacle of misrepresentation 
and single-issue politics". He warned that his next "nominee for the Court will 
share Judge Bork's belief injudicial restraint — that a judge is bound by the 
Constitution to interpret laws, not make them. In our democracy, it is the 
elected representatives of the people, not unelected judges, who make laws"80. 
On October 29, 1987, the President chose Judge Douglas Ginsburg, as 
his second nominee for the Supreme Court. A former Harvard law professor 
and Administration official, Judge Ginsburg had argued in court only once in 
his life and had become a federal appellate judge only a year earlier. The 
nomination process had been driven "by pressure to name someone quickly, 
with the clock ticking down on the second Reagan term and the prospect of 
increasing difficulty in getting any nominee confirmed as the 1988 election 
year approached"8I. The choice had been made before the customary inquiries 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, amid ideological feuding between 
Administration factions. 
78. New York Times, October 10, 1987, at 1. 
79. Id. 
80. Id., at 10. 
81. New York Times, November 8, 1987 at 34. 
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On November 7,1987, "[u]nder enormous pressure from Administration 
officials and his own conservative supporters on Capital Hill, Judge Douglas 
H. Ginsburg asked President Reagan to withdraw his nomination to the 
Supreme Court"82. The principal reason for the pressure had been press 
disclosures about his background including the use of marijuana while a 
professor at Harvard. 
One of the senators least critical of Judge Ginsburg's behavior was 
Democrat, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, who 
had personally led the opposition against Judge Robert Bork's confirmation. 
Senator Biden had dropped out of the Presidential race in September after 
disclosures that he had used, without attribution, the work of others for his 
campaign speeches and for a law school paper. 
The President's third nominee was Judge Anthony Kennedy of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, who proved to be more able than Judge Bork 
in giving testimony. "Choosing his words with care, Judge Kennedy steered a 
deft course through the committee members' early questioning in a session 
that lacked the tension and drama of the Bork hearings"83. 
"Senator Biden's question, 'Could you tell me what the Ninth Amendment 
means to you ?' was a heavily freighted moment because judicial liberals view 
the amendment as a theoretical foundation for an expansive view of constitu-
tional rights". Judge Bork had derogated the Ninth Amendment as a "waterblot 
on the Constitution" with no real meaning. Judge Kennedy said that when 
James Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, he wanted to assure "that the world 
understood that he did not have the capacity to foresee every verbal formulation 
that was necessary for the protection of the individual". Judge Kennedy said 
the Ninth Amendment served Madison's purpose by demonstrating that the 
Constitution need not be viewed as "a proclamation of every right of the free 
people". With a smile, Senator Biden told the nominee, "Judge, I don't want 
to hurt your prospects any, but I happen to agree with you"84. 
Another arch liberal, Senator Edward M. Kennedy was more probing in 
his questioning : 
You were a member of the Olympic Club for many years before you became a 
Federaljudge. You continued to be a member of the club for 12 years after, even 
though it discriminated against blacks and women. You apparently didn't try to 
change the discriminatory policies of the Olympic Club until the summer and 
you didn't resign until your name evidently surfaced on the short list of 
potential nominees. My question is a simple one. And then, why did it take so 
long?85 
82. Id., at 1. 
83. New York Times, December 15, 1987 at B16. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
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On February 3,1988, the seven-month battle over the vacant seat on the 
United States Supreme Court ended as the Senate confirmed Judge Anthony 
Kennedy with a 97 to 0 vote. On the Senate floor, the liberals seemed pleased. 
Senator Kennedy said that he welcomed the nominee's belief that "the 
Constitution is not a fossil frozen in the past, but a living document that 
protects rights [...] not detailed in the text itself'86. Senator Howell Heflin 
"appeared to speak for a number of other Democrats when he said that Judge 
Kennedy's 'conservatism, while pronounced, is not so severe as to prevent 
him from listening'"87. 
It was quite apparent that the liberal and conservative senators were 
finding in Judge Kennedy what they hoped to find. Senator Strom Thurmond, 
the long-time conservative from South Carolina and the ranking Republican 
on the Judiciary Committee praised Judge Kennedy as "an advocate of 
judicial restraint"88. 
Judge Kennedy had become a man for all ideologies, and the only 
remaining question, as well as the only important question, was : What would 
Justice Kennedy do as the newest member of the United States Supreme 
Court? 
Justice Kennedy took the oath as the 104th Justice on February 22,1988 
and on April 25,1988, the Supreme Court, on its own motion, elected by a 5-4 
margin to expand the scope of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union to the more 
fundamental issue of whether § 1981 should be available to minorities in 
private civil rights litigation. 
Justice Kennedy, author of the majority opinion, not only announced 
the decision, he unveiled an unmistakable judicial ideology : 
The law now reflects society's consensus that discrimination based on the color 
of one's skin is a profound wrong of tragic dimension. Neither our words nor 
our decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of retreat from 
Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in the private, as well as the public 
sphere. Nevertheless, in the area of private discrimination, to which the 
ordinance of the Constitution does not directly extend, our role is limited to 
interpreting what Congress may do and has done.89 
Writing for the Court liberals, now a minority, Justice Brennan viewed 
this analysis differently : 
What the Court declines to snatch away with one hand, it takes with the other. 
Though the Court today reaffirms § 1981 's applicability to private conduct, it 
86. New York Times, February 4, 1988 at AI8. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4711. 
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simultaneously gives this landmark civil rights statute a needlessly cramped 
interpretation [...] When it comes to deciding whether a civil rights statute 
should be construed to further our Nation's commitment to the eradication of 
racial discrimination, the Court adopts a formalistic method of interpretation 
antithetical to Congress' vision of a society in which contractual opportunities 
are equal.90 
The former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Warren Burger, had 
testified at the confirmation hearings that he could not recall a more qualified 
nominee than Judge Robert Bork over the past 50 years. The judge, however, 
through his extensive writings, was a well-known conservative ideologist. On 
the other hand, little was known about Judge Anthony Kennedy, and he 
received confirmation because of a pleasing style and non-controversial 
history. 
Ironically, the 52 Democrats and 6 Republicans who had voted against 
the confirmation of Judge Robert Bork and who had then joined the 
unanimous (97-0) confirmation of Judge Anthony Kennedy, had achieved 
little or nothing for their considerable efforts. 
Unquestionably, there will be a more thoughtful and consistent plan on 
the part of the liberals when the next vacancy occurs at the United States 
Supreme Court. 
90. Id. 
